Monday, October 15, 2012
Wednesday, October 03, 2012
Draft Egyptian Constitution Takes Away Religious Liberties Stipulated in Former Constitutions
A case in point is the debate over Article-8 of the draft of the constitution, which is restricting absolute religious liberties only to the three recognized religions in Egypt, i.e. Islam, Christianity and Judaism. All the rest, will have the freedom to "belief" but not the freedom to practice or to construct houses of worship. This clearly poses a contradiction in logic, interpretation and in application: how could one believe, but not practice?
According to this draft, and as an example, Buddhists, Hindus, Baha'is and others cannot freely practice their belief in Egypt, even though Egypt's government does deal and rely on large-scale investments and commerce with governments of countries with religious majorities representing most of these beliefs (Hindu & Buddhist). Since there are hardly any organized Hindu or Budddhist communities in Egypt, the influence on such populations in Egypt is only theoretical. That leaves the Baha'is--the most significant religious minority in this category--to be singled out for lack of civil rights and wide open to more discrimination.
Furthermore, in plain words, and according to the current rhetoric, promulgated by Islamists and many of those participating in drafting Egypt's new constitution, if you are a Baha'i in Egypt, you are not recognized or protected under the constitution or any laws that enforce equal rights because only adherents of the three religions are entitled to such protections. Very similar to the rhetoric used in Iran when its leader is asked about the persecution of Baha'is, his usual response has been "we do not persecute any religious minorities...then he would continue to respond by saying "what Baha'is?" Thus their mere existence is denied, and according to him there is no problem! The same trend seems to be prevailing in Egypt when the "party line" is always "we do not discriminate against any religious minorities," but what they really refer to is the Egyptian Christian minority and nothing else, even though Christians in Egypt continue to face much discrimination and persecution.
Egypt's Baha'is, even under the more liberal constitution of 1971, which allowed for freedom of belief and practice, have been constantly struggling for their civil rights, being deprived of identity cards, marriage certificates, birth certificates and death certificates, as well as discrimination in employment, health care and education. One can only imagine what it would be like, and the magnitude of hardships that would influence their daily living, if this new constitution is passed!
In its 2 October 2012 issue, Ahram Online, the English version of Egypt's leading semi-official newspaper, published a balanced report, by Osman El Sharnoubi, on this very question, including interviews with an Egyptian human rights lawyer, a scholar, a representative of Egypt's Baha'is, and another religious leader. The entire article, titled "New Egyptian constitution offers fewer religious freedoms, critics allege," and subtitled, "Article 8 of Egypt's draft constitution may take away religious freedoms stipulated in previous constitutions," is posted below:
Members of Egypt’s Constituent Assembly, the body tasked with drafting Egypt’s post-uprising constitution, are purportedly finished with drafting the chapter on the freedoms, rights and duties of citizens.
The assembly is largely seen as being dominated by Islamist forces, which have won large gains in legislative and presidential elections after the 2011 January Revolution.
Liberals and secularists have expressed concerns about the impact an Islamist-dominated drafting body will have on the character of the future charter, in particular in relation to key freedoms.
Article 8 of the draft constitution is at the heart of the debate, as it stipulates citizens’ religious freedoms. Religious rights and freedoms, and the issue of sectarian tensions between members of Egypt’s majority Muslim population and its Christian minority, remain controversial.
One of the many problems that Egypt’s Christian minority complains of are the difficulties of building and repairing churches, as both acts are subject to state control. A law was drafted in 2011 to address the problem but is yet to be put into effect.
Facing even graver difficulties than Christians are followers of the Bahai faith, a monotheistic religion established in the nineteenth century by the religion’s prophet Bahaaullah. The Egyptian state does not recognize the faith, leaving its Egyptian followers to face discrimination and difficulties in the most rudimentary aspects of civil life, such as registering marriages.
Article 8
Article 8 is the constitutional article on freedom of belief and religious practice, the mother clause stipulating the freedoms and rights of all matters religious within the Egyptian state.
The article was recently revised, and its multiple revisions published on the official website of the constituent assembly for public scrutiny.
“In the current draft, the state is not tasked with protecting freedom of belief,” political researcher and director of the Arab Forum for Alternatives Mohamed El-Agati said. El-Agati contends that the Mubarak-era 1971 constitution fares better on this point.
Article 8 of the current draft starts by stating: "Freedom of belief is absolute, and religious rights are practiced if not in contradiction with public order."
El-Agati says that the article withdraws from the state the duty of protecting religious freedoms, which was required of it as stipulated in Article 46 of the 1971 constitution, which read that “the state shall guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of practice of religious rites.”
The new draft article adds the condition “if not in contradiction with the public order” to the practice of religious rites, said El-Agati, putting further limits compared to the last constitution.
In the Turkish constitution, the state restricts putting limits on worshiping and in Indonesia the constitution gives the state the duty to guarantee the freedom of practicing religion, said El-Agati. This won’t be the case if the current draft article is enshrined in Egypt’s constitution.
The problem didn’t exist in an earlier version of Article 8, written earlier in the drafting process and amended to its present form.
Human rights lawyer Ahmed Seif El-Islam, founder of the Cairo-based Hisham Mubarak Law Centre, points to the form of the previous version, which had stated that the freedom of belief and the freedom of practicing religion is granted.
“The freedom of belief and practicing religious rights is safeguarded,” the article had said before being amended.
Seif El-Islam criticised the amended phrasing, saying that it deals with freedom of belief only in a private, personal way, rendering it useless. "The freedom of belief must be followed by the freedom of practice, otherwise it loses its essence," Seif El-Islam said.
Nevertheless, Seif El-Islam sees a positive - albeit limited - development in the article’s current form, which stipulates that the state guarantees the freedom to construct places of worship for Abrahamic religions (Islam, Christianity and Judaism).
“This is a step forward for Christians and Shiites, yet not so much for members of other religions,” said Seif El-Islam. “A community of expatriate Chinese Buddhists for example wouldn’t be able to establish a temple,” said Seif El-Islam, adding that since Egypt doesn’t have large expat communities from other religions the problem remains only theoretical.
“In reality, it is members of the Bahai faith who would suffer under this article,” Seif El-Islam asserted.
El-Agati sees a further implication to the restriction of building places of worship to the 3 major religions by the article, related to Egyptian Muslims living abroad.
“The article weakens the positions of Muslims living in non-Muslim countries and suffering under certain forms of discrimination such as restrictions on building mosques,” says El-Agati.
“Egyptians wouldn’t be able to object to restrictions on building minarets in Switzerland, or wearing the veil in France,” he told Ahram Online.
El-Agati believes the article is generally detrimental to the concept of citizenship and opens the door for discrimination on the basis of religion.
Constitution vs. reality
Labib Iskandar, a Bahai professor of engineering at Cairo University, highlights what he says is a contradiction in the draft article - “how can you say freedom of belief is absolute and then only mention main religions?” he asked.
To Iskandar, however, it is not the constitution that matters but what happens in reality. The 1971 constitution hadn’t limited the religions which have the right to practice their rituals, and yet Bahais still struggled for recognition and rights.
Still, for Iskandar, what’s more important than the state recognizing the Bahai religion is to enjoy civil rights, which the state so far does not grant.
The state continues to pose many obstacles for Bahais, including not recognising their matrimonial contracts and thus refusing to give them a “married” status on their national IDs, as well as refusing to issue electronic copies of their death certificates, causing legal hurdles and risks for members of the faith.
“Implementing constitutional laws is key. In the 1971 charter freedom of religion was protected yet it is up to officials to interpret it, easily deciding that the Bahai faith is not a religion to begin with,” Iskandar explained.
Seif El-Islam took up this point, saying that “a state could have a wonderful constitution and shelve it,” a situation wherein practices on the ground would be in complete contradiction to the spirit of the constitution.
A good case in point is the position of Egypt’s Shiites, which contradictory sources say range from just over 10,000 to more then 1 million Egyptians. Many pundits don’t consider the constitutional article to be a threat to Shiites, since Shiism is a Muslim sect.
However, as Seif El-Islam points out, what is written on paper could differ by leagues from the case in reality, where the mainstream Sunni stance on Shiism isn’t favourable.
“There will never be a struggle between Sunnis and Shiites in Egypt,” El-Tarek El-Hashimi, a leading Egyptian Shiite told Ahram Online, saying Shiites are keen on preventing sectarian strife.
El-Hashimi stresses that Shiites follow the same school of Islamic theology, the Ashaarite theology, as does the leading Sunni institution of Al-Azhar, foreseeing no problem concerning freedom of belief and religious practice.
“Religious rights between both sects are the same,” argues El-Hashimi.
Despite El-Hashimi’s optimism, a Shiite was sentenced to a year in prison in September for allegedly starting a fight due to his mode of prayer - or “his actions that violate the Sunni sect” - in a village mosque.
The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights appealed the sentence of Mohamed Fahmy Asfour, the Azharite teacher, saying he was handed it due to his belonging to the Shiite faith and expressing its concern regarding attacks on freedom of belief and expression.
The court said some of Asfour’s practices during prayer which are different from Sunni’s “incited discomfort” among other worshipers, which caused the scuffle.
Constitution vs. law
Seif El-Islam raised yet another concern about the constitution, saying it doesn’t necessarily follow that laws are based on the constitution, explaining that a constitution could be drawn up but the legal structure preceding it could remain unchanged.
Seif El-Islam is wary that the laws would not respect the new constitution, saying it would be left for individuals on a case-by-case basis to change laws, as courts may decide the unconstitutionality of certain laws according to each case, a long and tedious process.
“As soon as the constitution is drafted, there should be a period of 5 years within which the process of amending laws to conform to the constitution should be institutionalised,” Seif El-Islam suggested.
Institutions such as the parliament, trade unions, NGOs and others should be tasked with this process, he said, allowing the country’s social forces to make sure their constitution is being followed. This is assuming the current draft would be viewed favourably by Egypt’s citizens.
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Sunday, September 30, 2012
The Case of the Baha'is in Egypt: a scholarly legal essay
Here is another well-researched legal brief on the case of the Baha'is in Egypt that explores their history in that land, their trials and tribulations, and their current struggle in post-Mubarak Egypt.
This
article was written by Naseem Kourosh and appeared in the International
Law News Volume 41, Number 3, Summer 2012, a publication of the American
Bar Association (ABA). It is posted here with the permission of the author.
A Cold Winter in North Africa:The Case of the Bahá’ís in Egypt
By Naseem Kourosh
For Egypt’s tiny Bahá’í community, the coming
winter may be an especially cold one. The Bahá’í
Faith is an independent religion with an estimated 500 to 2,000 followers in Egypt, many
of whom have faced significant discrimination in recent
years. In early 2011, many expected that the Arab Spring,
blooming most visibly in Egypt, would usher in a new era
in the region. However, more than a year on, amidst fears
that Spring in the Middle East may be turning frosty, the
status of Egypt’s Bahá’í community provides an important
if unflattering metric of the progress of Egyptian society
towards freedom, democracy, and human rights.
The History of Egypt’s Bahá’í Community
The Bahá’í community in Egypt was established in the
mid-1800s and, with a few notable exceptions, developed
largely undisturbed for nearly a century. However, in 1960,
the government issued Presidential Decree 263, which dissolved all Bahá’í institutions, seized all Bahá’í properties,
and made engaging in public Bahá’í activities a criminal act
punishable by imprisonment. In subsequent years, several
dozen Bahá’ís were arrested and detained on the basis of
the law, though none were ever found guilty.
While Article 40 of the 1971 Egyptian Constitution
protects equal rights and prohibits religious discrimination, and Article 46 guarantees freedom of belief and freedom to practice religious rites, the legal status of Bahá’ís
in Egypt has never been deemed equal to that of Muslims,
not only because of the 1960 Presidential Decree, but also
because of two important structural issues.
First, in the Egyptian legal system, matters of personal
status are governed not by civil law, but by religious law—
specifically the family law systems of the only three staterecognized religions: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.
Because Bahá’í law is not recognized and Islam is the official state religion, personal status for Bahá’ís has often been
determined according to shari’a (Islamic family law), which
does not recognize Bahá’í family relationships, or fatwas
(Islamic judicial rulings), many of which are hostile to
the Bahá’í Faith. Indeed, at least 15 fatwas have declared
the Bahá’í Faith to be heresy and blasphemy. In 2003, the
Islamic Research Center of Al-Azhar University—one of the
oldest and most respected centers of Islamic learning in the
world—issued a fatwa stating that Bahá’ís are apostates and
that the Bahá’í Faith is a “lethal spiritual epidemic” that the
state must “annihilate.”
As a result of the nonrecognition of Bahá’í family law
and the influence of anti-Bahá’í fatwas, Bahá’ís are not
accorded equal treatment under the law: Bahá’í marriages
are not recognized, Bahá’í children are regarded as illegitimate, and Bahá’ís have no means of controlling matters
such as family allowances, pensions, inheritance, divorce,
alimony, and custody of children.
Second, the free exercise of religion has traditionally
been permitted only insofar as it has not been deemed
to disturb public order and good morals—both of which
have historically been defined according to Muslim clerics
who believe that the Bahá’í Faith inherently violates public order and good morals because it is heresy or apostasy
against Islam. Thus, a 1975 decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court held that the constitutional freedom of
belief guaranteed by the constitution protected only the
Bahá’ís’ right to inwardly believe in their religion, and not
their right to practice it.
The ID Card Controversy
The Egyptian government requires all citizens to possess
standardized government ID cards, which are necessary for
obtaining basic services. These ID cards, like other official
documents, require the individual to list his or religious
affiliation. Bahá’ís do not, as a matter of principle, misrepresent their religion. Thus, although the government only
recognizes three “heavenly” religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—Bahá’ís will generally not misidentify
themselves as a member of one of these religions. Historically, this was not problematic, as Bahá’ís were permitted to
write “Bahá’í” or insert a dash in the religion field of official
documents. However, following the issuance of the 1960
Presidential Decree, many government officials refused to
register Bahá’ís as such, and ID card registration for each
Bahá’í became dependent on the actions of the particular clerk in a given government office. This led to serious
inconsistencies, with Bahá’ís being variously identified as
Christian, Muslim, Bahá’í, or no religion at all—or being
denied ID cards altogether. In 1983, an administrative court
affirmed that Bahá’ís should be allowed to list “Bahá’í” or
“other” on their ID cards, but it held that a Bahá’í student
who had been expelled from university for not possessing
a valid ID card could still be rightfully expelled, even after
receiving a valid ID card, as he was an apostate, and apostates should not be allowed to pursue education.
In 2004, the Ministry of the Interior issued Circular
49/2004, a directive that instructed government officials
not to issue a new ID card or any other new government
document to any individual unless she or he identified as
a member of one of the three recognized state religions.
Bahá’ís were explicitly denied the right to write in “other,”
insert a dash, or leave the religion field blank. Bahá’ís were
therefore forced to either falsely identify their religion or
go without documents. Because they would not willingly
misrepresent their religious identity, many Bahá’ís were
unable to obtain ID cards and other official documents,
which resulted in a denial of access to many essential government services. Bahá’í children were denied birth certificates and were therefore unable to attend public school
or receive immunizations; Bahá’í youth and adults were
denied national ID cards and were thus unable to obtain
employment, attend university, obtain medical treatment
at public hospitals, acquire driver’s licenses, or engage
in financial transactions such as opening a bank account
or acquiring title to property. Bahá’ís were also unable to
obtain death certificates for deceased family members,leaving their heirs unable to legally acquire inheritance.
Soon after the policy was implemented, a Bahá’í couple, unable to obtain ID cards or register their daughters for school, challenged the 2004 policy. Represented by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (“EIPR”), an independent Cairo-based NGO, the couple obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Administrative Justice. The court’s April 2006 ruling held that Bahá’ís must be allowed to identify their religion properly on government forms and that the government cannot deny them official documents if they do so. The Ministry of the Interior appealed the ruling, which was publicly decried by Al-Azhar and the Muslim Brotherhood, a conservative political movement. In December 2006, the Supreme Administrative Court overturned the lower court’s decision and upheld the 2004 policy, holding that only individuals identifying themselves with Islam, Christianity, or Judaism were eligible to receive government documents.
These decisions received intense media coverage in Egypt and also garnered international attention. The U.S. State Department and the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom noted the December ruling with concern. In a 2007 report, Human Rights Watch and EIPR documented in detail the genesis and implementation of the new government policy; the Egyptian government’s violation of its own constitution and international human rights norms, including several rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Egypt has been a state party since 1982; and the personal stories of Bahá’ís, Copts (Egyptian Orthodox Christians), converts from Islam, and others whose lives have been negatively impacted by the policy.
In 2007, a second Bahá’í couple, who were unable to obtain birth certificates for their twin daughters, challenged the policy. Once again represented by EIPR, the couple obtained another favorable ruling in the Court of Administrative Justice. The lower court’s January 2008 ruling stated that, while Bahá’ís could not list “Bahá’í” as their religion on government documents, they must be permitted to insert a dash in the religion field. In March 2009, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed an appeal, allowing the lower court’s ruling to stand. The following month, the Ministry of the Interior implemented a new policy consistent with the court’s ruling: government officials must place a dash (–) in the religion field of official documents of citizens who show they are followers of a religion other than the three recognized by the state. In August 2009, five years after the problematic new policy was introduced, the government issued the first new ID cards to Bahá’ís with a dash in the religion field.
Bahá’ís in Post-Mubarak Egypt
Much has happened since 2009. On January 25, 2011, motivated by Tunisia’s success in ousting President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, millions of Egyptians took to the streets, participating in an 18-day popular uprising that ultimately led to the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak. The wave of uprisings that swept the Middle East beginning with Tunisia in late 2010 and continuing through Egypt and several other Arab countries throughout 2011 was initially dubbed the Arab Spring, in reference to an anticipated renewal of freedom, democracy, and human rights throughout the Arab world as a result of the revolutions.
In the last several months, however, some commentators have rejected this label, quipping that the movement may be more aptly referred to as the Arab Winter. There has been violent, bloody, and brutal repression of uprisings in countries such as Libya, Bahrain, and Syria. And even in Egypt, where the revolution was relatively brief, largely nonviolent, and initially deemed quite successful, the year after the revolution has raised serious doubts about the democratic future of Egypt.
In this context, the future of Egypt’s Bahá’í community remains particularly uncertain. First, the 1960 Presidential Decree, which criminalizes many aspects of the practice of the Bahá’í faith, remains in effect. Second, while the 2009 accommodation with respect to ID cards was a positive development, delays and complications have arisen in the implementation of the new policy. Ultimately, Bahá’ís are still denied the right to do what members of the three staterecognized religions are able to do: truthfully list their religion on government documents. Third, Bahá’ís have been the target of recent social hostilities, including a 2009 incident that remains uninvestigated in which several Bahá’í homes in a village were vandalized and a February 2011 incident in which several Bahá’í homes in the same village were torched. Finally, and perhaps of greatest concern, there are indications that Bahá’ís may be excluded from, and perhaps even specifically targeted by, the new political order. Leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, which won the highest number of seats in the recent parliamentary elections, have stated that they have no plans to amend Article 2 of Egypt’s current constitution when they draft its new one. Leaders of the Salafi movement, a fundamentalist group that won the second highest number of seats in the parliamentary elections, have made similar statements. Article 2 currently provides that Islam is the state religion and principles of Islamic law are the chief sources of legislation. Apparently, it will be incorporated into the new constitution. In addition, in February, Abdel Moneim alShahat, a spokesperson for the Salafi movement, publicly stated that Bahá’ís are not entitled to rights under Islam and are a threat to national security. Citing the 2003 AlAzhar fatwa, al-Shahat asserted that Bahá’ís “do not exist” by virtue of their faith and should be prosecuted for treason. Thus, at present, the legal status of Egyptian Bahá’ís does not seem likely to improve, and may in fact worsen. If there is to be a winter in Egypt, it may be a long and cold one for the Bahá’ís.
A society’s treatment of its minorities is often a barometer of its general level of freedom and equality, and its persecution of its religious minorities frequently foreshadows wider repression. Thus, those concerned about the democratic future of Egypt would do well to keep a close eye on the situation of religious minorities such as the Bahá’ís under the new régime.
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Friday, September 07, 2012
Arab Spring becomes Cold Winter for Egypt's Baha'is!
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Thursday, August 23, 2012
The Baha'i Case in Egypt: as seen by an independent observer
The full article can be accessed at this link, and, for convenience, is posted below as well:
A BAHA’I LITMUS TEST FOR EGYPT
Dwight BashirAugust 22, 2012
In 2006, Saad Eddin Ibrahim – the revered Egyptian human rights advocate and former political prisoner – commented to the press on the precarious situation of Baha’is in Egypt, who were forced, at the time, to use the court system to obtain identity cards which the state had denied them.
The Baha’i faith is an independent world religion whose adherents seek global peace and unity for humankind through the promotion of central tenets, including the full equality between women and men, the elimination of all forms of bigotry, the abolishment of extremes of wealth and poverty, universal education, and the establishment of a world federal system based on collective security. The estimates vary widely for numbers of Baha’is in Egypt, from several hundred to more than five thousand. There are approximately 170,000 in the United States, more than 300,000 in Iran (the country’s largest non-Muslim religious minority), at least two million in India (by far the largest concentration in one country), and nearly six million worldwide. Today, Baha’i communities are established globally and are recognized as an independent religious community in most countries in the world, with the exception of a number of Arab and predominantly Muslim countries, including Egypt, where varying forms of discrimination continue.
Historically, Baha’is were persecuted most severely in the land of the faith’s birth, Iran, where, in the mid 1800s, approximately 20,000 Baha’is were killed because they were deemed by Muslim clerics as heretics from Islam. Since the Islamic revolution in Iran in the late 1970s, more than 200 Baha’i leaders have been killed and thousands of others have been arrested or imprisoned by authorities for no other reason than their identity as Baha’is.
Ibrahim said the contested status of Bahai’s in Egypt was as important as anything else going on in the country and its outcome would demonstrate “where the government is heading on the issue of freedom.” Members of the community eventually won the right to have dashes (--) on official ID cards but not their religious affiliation in the mandatory section which permits only “Muslim, Christian, or Jew.” While an improvement from not having ID cards at all, Baha’is still were being denied the rights of other Egyptian citizens.
Now more than 18 months removed from the January 25 revolution, as many Egyptians still seek full freedom and equality, the plight of Egypt’s Baha’i community remains a powerful litmus test for where things might be headed. A recent spate of public statements and actions about the Baha’is by various entities in society provides a compelling indicator of the trajectory.
The religion dates back to the 1860s in Egypt. It formed a national governing body in 1924 and suffered only periodic verbal attacks by extremist clerics until president Gamal Abdel Nasser, allegedly under Islamist pressure, issued a decree in 1960 banning all Baha’i activities. For decades since, Baha’is have been harassed, vilified, discriminated against, and imprisoned because of their beliefs.
Over the years, Egypt’s government-controlled media has been a key propagator of false and inflammatory information about Baha’is. In a new Egypt, could things actually be changing for the worse? The appointment this month by the Shura Council of Gamal Abdel Rahim as chief editor of the state-controlled newspaper, Al-Ghomhurryia, bodes ill for Baha’is. Rahim was accused in 2009 of calling for the murder of a Baha’i activist on live television and inciting residents in Sohag to burn Baha’i homes. Three days after the program aired, arson destroyed several Baha’is houses in a Sohag village. The denigration and repression of Baha’is in Egypt has been fueled by bogus and inflammatory accusations that state media and political and religious leaders have perpetuated for generations. They can be boiled down to three myths.
Myth #1: Baha’is are a Zionist entity and, therefore, not entitled to any rights. Last month, Mahmoud Ghozlan, a spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood, said Baha’is are of “Zionist origin” and, thus, should not be protected under the constitution to practice their faith publicly. What “origin” has to do with constitutional protections for any of Egypt’s citizens is anyone’s guess. Leaving this point aside, the particular accusation is baseless. It is leveled solely because the Baha’i world headquarters is in Haifa, Israel. This, however, was clearly not the preference of Baha’i leaders at the time. The faith’s founder, Baha’u’llah, was imprisoned and exiled throughout the region during Ottoman rule in the 1800s: from Iran and Iraq to Turkey and Palestine. Baha’u’llah died while under house arrest in 1892 in Acre, Palestine. It was his family and followers who established the administrative center of the faith there, more than a half century before 1948, the year the state of Israel was born. Moreover, based on the logic of his position, Ghozlan would be forced to call every resident of Palestine or Israel a Zionist. Clearly, that’s not what he meant, but this demonstrates the absurdity of his claim about the Baha’is. Of the nearly six million Baha’is in the world today, fewer than 1,000 reside in what is now Israel. They serve as temporary volunteers at the Baha’i World Center and eventually return to their home countries after a short period.
Myth #2: Baha’is are a threat to national security. Like Myth #1, this dubious claim hinges on the location of the Baha’i world headquarters in Israel. This claim is made most frequently by conservative clerics such as Abdel Moneim al-Shahat, a prominent Salafi leader who reportedly once said that Islam forbids playing or watching soccer. In February, he stated that Baha’is are a security threat, claimed that Baha’is deserve no rights in a new constitution, and asserted that Baha’is should be tried for treason. Such irresponsible statements promote the further demonization of Baha’is in society and pour fuel on the fire of extremist attacks on Baha’is.
Myth #3: Baha’is are apostates from Islam and, therefore, should be eliminated by the state. Al-Shahat, and others like him cite Al-Azhar’s fatwas declaring Baha’is as apostates. This accusation is based on numerous fatwas issued by the Islamic Research Academy at Al-Azhar University over the years, most recently reiterated in 2003. The gist of the argument is a theological one, that Baha’is claim divine revelation after the Prophet Muhammad, which makes them apostates from Islam because, in their view, Muhammad was the last of the Prophets from God.
However, religion experts explain that the Baha’i faith emerged out of Islam similar to the way Christianity sprang from Judaism and is separate and distinct. In fact, in 1925, Egypt became the first predominantly Muslim state to recognize the Baha’i faith as an independent religion after an Egyptian court ruled that the faith indeed was separate from Islam, and consequently, Baha’is could not be deemed heretics or apostates. This ruling led to greater emancipation for the Egyptian Baha’is in the decades thereafter, and they were legally recognized in the 1930s until the 1960 ban. Since then, conservative clerics and political leaders alike have used Al-Azhar’sfatwas and Nasser’s ban to justify discrimination, vilification, and incitement.
The Egyptian Baha’i community appears destined toward experiencing another generation of marginalization and, perhaps, outright persecution. To be sure, no one expects the state-controlled press, Al-Azhar, the Muslim Brotherhood, or the Salafists to agree with Baha’i views, or for that matter, cease from criticizing its theology. However, the burden rests on them to refrain from inciting violence and hatred, justifying repression on the basis of their faith, and calling for restricting Baha’i rights by insisting that only the “heavenly religions” (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) be protected by law. If all these entities truly espouse the principles of the January 25 revolution, they would champion the rights of all Egyptian citizens, regardless of religion or belief.
The burden is also on Egyptian human rights defenders and independent media to debunk the myths about the peaceful, law-abiding Baha’is and demand that they, along with their fellow Egyptians who are Muslims, including Sunni, Shi’a, Sufi, and Quranist, Christians, Jews, atheists, and other persuasions, be protected under the same laws that apply to all citizens. There should be no distinction when it comes to the inalienable right of religious freedom.
Judging by Saad Eddin Ibrahim’s sage words in 2006, Egypt’s democratic transition appears to be headed in the wrong direction. It doesn’t have to be that way.
Dwight Bashir is the Deputy Director for Policy and Research at the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. The views expressed here are his own, and may or may not reflect the views of the Commission. He can be followed on Twitter @DwightBashir.
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